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CONGRESSIONAL lliCORD-SI 'ATI

MANSFIELD
fr. Pre~ident, I
know of no Member of this body who Is
not very f:wornbly inclined toward
Grecc('. I know of no enemies of Greece
in this body. But there are differences
of opinion :ts to how we should face up,
in our cap;lcity as an outsider. to the
sttu:1 t!on whi ch has developed in the
Aq; ean, centerint: around the island of
Cyprus.
The statement ho.s been made that
there h:tve been no Jt('[::ottattons. I wi ~h
to assure the Scn:1tc that there have
been talks. U1at the Serrctnt·y of SL:1 lc
h:ts cnrricd on dbrw-~ !ons with boLh the
Greeks nnd the Turks. nnd that in his
opinion. If he Is allowed a lillie leeway,
n little tlcxlllil!ty. the outlook as far as
GrC'ece is concerned is much better than
it would be with the amendment which
has been passed by the Senate already
by a vote of 3 to 1. and which is now
before us again in the form of a motion
to recommit.
I would like to emphasize that In my
opinion Secretary Kissinger's attitude
and activity toward and in relation to
the Cyprus situation ha.s not. been pathetic, nor, for that matter. has it been
peripatetic. What he has tried to do is
stay clear, to allow the original signatories to the treaty of 1960, the United
Kingdom-which still ha.s troops on
Cypt1JS, incidenta.lly, and has had since
1960-Greece. and Turkey, those three.
to see if some way could not. be worked
out to bring about a solution as satisfactory a.s possible to all concerned.
I commend the Secretary of State for
finally, in one Instance, not advocating
interference or intervention. Maybe out
of that has come a lesson which w111
stand us in good stead m the future. if
we stick with it. if we stay out of other
people's business. tend to our own. render
our good offices. and do what we can,
through negotiations, to bring about as
reasonable a solution a.s possible.
We are not talking of war and peace
1n the abstract; we have been talking o!
war in reality, and the casualty figures,

the dead and the wounded, will suffice
to prove that statement.
What we are seeking now is peace on
Cyprus. What we want to do is bring
P.bout a withdrawal of the Turkish forces
from the island. Under the present situation they will withdra.w neither in part
nor in whole.
What we want to do is try to give some
stability, some understanding. some
prestige to the Karamanlis government,
\Yhirh I think has the unanimous support of the 100 Members of the U.S. Senate and the Government of the United
States as well. We think Ka.ramanlis is
a great man, but we think he needs a
chance to reestablish democracy in
Grerre. and in so doing, we h:we to recognize that he is being bur"etect on the
one hand by the right and on the other
lln nd b> the left.
So those of us-and I think this applies to all Senators. regardless of
whether or not they voted for the Eagleton amendment-do have the bf>st interests of Greece at heart. and we would
like to see 1t restored and become once
again the country it was befo1:e It was
taken over by the military dictat.orship.
GreP ·e has withdrawn from NATO. to
what extent I cannot say. Turkey may
well withdraw from NATO if the present
situation continues. But I would point
out again, as I did on yesterday, that
there are four factors we ought to keep
in consideration in relation to the situation which might devcl:::>p if this amendment holds. and if the reaction is as I anticipate it will be.
For. one. my possibility of mediation,
negotiation. or talk to and among the
three parties by SC'cretary of State Kissinger would well be negated.
Two, we find that the Turks have a
thousand-mile fronl!CI' with the Soviet
Union and. instead of tilting toward us,
as they have for so many years. one result of this might be a tilt in the direction of their ancient adversary to the
north.
Three. there is the question of a Mohammedan people, a Moslem peoplethat Is the religion of the Turks-taking
a more active interest in the situation
in the Middle East and. thereby, making
it more difficult for us. for Secretary Kissinger, to arrive at a peaceful understanding of the situation there and between the nations in that area. That is
a most difficult, a most delicate, and a
most dangerous situation still today, one
which may erupt if we are not careful
and do not play our cards correctly.
Then we have to consider the overall
possibility, No. 4. that, as a result
of this, Turkey might withdraw fwm
NATO. and in Turkey and in Greece we
have U.S. installations. What would be
the effect of a double withdrawal from
NATO by Greece, on the one hand, and
Turkey, on the other? The effect would
be to weaken the strongest link in NATO
because both Greece and Turkey, if my
memory is correct. have fulfilled their
obligations to the hilt, and they have
maintained the necessary forces on that
tl.ank to achieve security in that area.
As I have indicated, I am a friend of
NATO, but I am not a friend of ha.vlng
so many U.S. troops and military de-
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pendants 30 years after the war still
stationed on the Continent.
So what we are doing here in offering
tllis motion to recommit is, in my opinion. in a true sense we are doing it ns
a friend of Greece. We want to see
Greece survive and grow. We want to sec
her prestige restored. We want to sec
ICaramn.nlis retained, nnd we want to
give the Greeks a chance to bring about
some degree of recuperation from that
\\hich they have sullcrcd because of Lite
C'vnru..<; inrlrtent in the first place,.) · _

